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Contesting Word Meaning: Insights into Bhartṛhari's Arguments in the Vākyapadīya

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Abstract: Early thoughts on language are found in the Vedic literature but formal and rigorous discussions on the philosophy of language were initiated by Sanskrit grammarians in the classical period. Patañjali, author of the monumental work the *Mahābhāṣya*, (lit. great commentary) stepped beyond the role of a commentator on Pāṇinian metarules of grammar to observe the language in use in contrast to that straightjacketed by prescriptive grammatical rules. However, it was Bhartṛhari (fl. 500 – 700 CE) who proposed a major theory known as the indivisibility thesis (*akhaṇḍapakṣavāda*) of meaning in his magnum opus the *Vākyapadīya* in order to present Patañjali's views in a more logical format. Bhartṛhari expertise in Sanskrit grammar bolstered with an applied approach to the language enabled him to establish firmly this theory on the theistic platform of Advaita Vedanta. Some later grammarians in the mainstream Pāṇinian grammatical tradition and a few schools of Indian philosophy also modelled their theories on Bhartṛhari's approach to sentential meaning, while some others criticized him for misusing the Advaita Vedantic theology with the aim of justifying the indivisibility of meaning. This paper briefly examines Bhartṛhari's paraphrase of the line of arguments as raised by upholders of the primacy of word meaning, the Mīmāṃsakas in particular. It prepared him for theorizing the syntactic and semantic indivisibility and the primacy of sentential meaning.

Keywords: Word Meaning, Bhartṛhari, Indivisibility thesis (*akhaṇḍapakṣavāda*), Sanskrit grammar, Indian philosophy of language

Introduction

Bhartṛhari considered to have flourished between the fifth and seventh centuries CE in India could be the most significant linguist who had a clearly distinguishable philosophy of his own. Several works have been ascribed to Bhartṛhari since the Bhartṛhari who was a philosopher-grammarians is also believed to be the Bhartṛhari who composed several poetical works. However, the VP (*Vākyapadīya*), which literally means 'one that treats of sentence/s and word/s' alias the *Trikaṇḍī*, i.e. 'one that is constituted of three sections' is the most momentous treatise by Bhartṛhari. Despite numerous uncertainties about his date, Bhartṛhari can be introduced as a Sanskrit

grammarians of the mainstream initiated by Pāṇini plus a philosopher of the non-dualistic (Advaita) Vedānta tradition. [1] Further, he stands significant in the history of Indian philosophy of language and grammar because he was a firm upholder of the language in flux and its practical usage. Unlike most of the Sanskrit grammarians who attempted to impose rules to rectify, limit or even to stop the flux of the language, Bhartṛhari observed the language flow in keeping with the changes in anthropological, social and cultural settings it is used in and then provided it with a philosophical interpretation. He did not tolerate clinging blindly to the already established normative grammar which is purposively taught to a language user but rather promoted the practicality of the language and the benefits of learning the language as it has been in practice. Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language is also neither entirely separated from nor merged into Advaita Vedānta school of Indian philosophy. Given the logical organization of its content, his system of philosophy was one with its own identity remodelled by Bhartṛhari himself but its underlying structure was borrowed from the well-established Advaita Vedānta tradition. However, this is not to exaggerate that Bhartṛhari individually established a completely novel school of philosophy without being influenced by his predecessors at all. Rather, he developed a new line of thoughts on the language and grammar and shaped it in the mould of Advaita Vedānta so that it could stand on its own feet with due respect to the traditionalism.[2] That new line of thoughts has such an account of peculiar characteristics that it deserves to be designated as a new philosophy. This paper briefly examines Bhartṛhari's paraphrase of the line of arguments as raised by upholders of the primacy of word meaning, the Mīmāṃsakas in particular. This paraphrase of the opponents' position enabled him to establish the primacy of sentential meaning, on the underpinning of the Advaita Vedānta theology.

1. Background of the Rejection

A considerable number of *kārikās* in the VP are dedicated to establishing the view that *pada* (the word) and *padārtha* (the word-meaning) cannot be distinguished as such since they do not have any ontic or semantic significance apart from the *vākya* they must occur in. The position of those advocating that the word is true and real as the basic unit of the language against that of the upholders of the indivisibility thesis is encapsulated in the following *kārikā*. [3]

abhedapūrvakā bhedaḥ kalpitā vākyavādibhiḥ
bhedapūrvānbhedāṃstu manyante padadarśinaḥ [4]

It is held by those taking the *vākya* as the primary unit that the (prima facie) divisions are the indivisible (in reality) while those taking the word as the primary unit consider the indivisible (i.e. the *vākya*) to be the divisible originally. [5]

Bhartṛhari and his commentators also elaborate these two positions with the help of Vedic sources and Sanskrit grammarians' teachings. For example, Bhartṛhari's commentator Puṅgyarāja explains by quoting from the Vedic *prātiśākhya*s that the sentence (*saṃhitā*) per se is the source of the word (*padaprakṛtiḥ saṃhitā*). [6] The compound '*padaprakṛti*' is subject to numerous interpretations including those by Vedic commentators, etymologists and grammarians but the philosophers on the indivisibility prefer a different reading as above.

Accordingly, the *vākya* speculated by the pluralists like the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas as an aggregation of components is accepted as the source (*yoni/ prakṛti*) of the word. Although it seems to be a purposely carved out reading incompatible with that in the Vedic literature, Bhartṛhari systematically defends it throughout the VP. Puṇyārāja also stresses that this reading is possible because the words are untrue.^[7]

The word-meaning is rejected on the ground that it cannot be discriminated as individually existent. This approach, however, is not limited to the dealing with the words and the word-meanings because the upholders of the *Vākyavāda* (*vākyavādins*) as a whole can be introduced more precisely as semanticists than prescriptive grammarians. According to their view, separate words have to be recognized as meaningless (*anarthaka*) for the sentence-meaning is not understood from the word-meanings the same way the word-meaning is not understood from the meaning of a single phoneme.^[8] Nevertheless, this view should not be taken to be contradictory to Bhartṛhari's saying that the understanding of the sentential meaning is possible even from a single syllable.^[9] It is because, as he emphatically says, in certain cases, for example, the word 'no' in English to express refusal, denial, disbelief etc., even a single syllable can convey a complete meaning without having recourse to more linguistic or paralinguistic units. Whether that unit, though miniature in size, brings forth a complete meaning (*parisamāptārtha*) thus interests us as the general users of the language.

In the *Vākyakāṇḍa* of the VP, we find a series of arguments from the *Padavādins* or the upholders of the primacy of the word and the word-meaning against the primacy of the sentence and sentential meaning. Some of them are recognizable as those by the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas because those views reoccur in the major works of those philosophical schools while some others appear to be those proleptically created by Bhartṛhari himself to more categorically convince others of the indefensibility of those arguments. I would like to summarize them into two prominent lines of arguments; (i) on the independence and (ii) on the constructability. The first line of arguments empowers the second line or, put differently, the *Padavādins* could defend the second line of arguments only if the first line is tenable.

The first line of argument is for the ontic and semantic independence of the word. Put precisely, the words do not depend on any larger unit either to continue to exist or to express their own meaning. The *Padavādins* produce a series of detailed arguments with numerous examples to defend that view in their philosophical traditions which I do not restate here. However, a typical situation that favours the independence of the word in practical application is given below. Consider a case where an isolated word remains semantically ambiguous and we could make it less ambiguous or semantically saturated by adding not a sentence but only one more word. Even when the context does not help, how is it possible for the newly added word to remove the ambiguity of the isolated word if the former does not have a meaning of its own? The modifiers alias qualifiers such as adjectives and adverbs in the language may play their role because of their semantic independence. This line of argument is also applicable to the process of determining the specific meaning of a certain expression out of its several possible meanings. A classic example from the VP follows here; if the imperative 'yajata' [offer the sacrifice/ recite the yājyā verse] is employed severally at the time of a Vedic sacrificial ceremony, with what the gods should be honoured remains undetermined and ambiguous and thereby any type of oblation may become applicable. The contextual data may not be helpful enough because of the multiplicity of possible

alternatives under that context which would linger as long as the isolated word is left unsupported. If one more word, 'with rice' (*vr̥thinā*), is added to the imperative, then the meaning of the expression becomes complete and other probable alternatives (*pratinidhi*) for oblation are made inapplicable. In other words, the semantic diversity of the expression is restricted and a specific meaning is determined so that comprehension becomes easier. [10] Only when the meanings of the separated words are understood is removed the uncertainty [11] of the intended meaning of the expression in question. [12] Since the newly added word in our example exists by its own it does not require any other force to get connected to the isolated word. Similarly, it is semantically independent enough to influence another semantic unit to remove the latter's deficiency. The independence arguments thus bolster the *Padavāda*.

The constructability argument is powered by the individual word's semantic independence. Accordingly, both the word and the sentence are 'constructible' entities since it is evident that a word is constructed by combining the phonemes and a sentence by combining the words. [13] Here it should be reminded again that the *Padavādins* are the supporters of the compositionality thesis and also pluralists in their theologies. The ground for the semantic capacity of the phonemes is their characteristic of collectivity. The same way a subtle substance like a dust particle can be grasped along with more of it, a phoneme becomes expressive of meaning by getting together with more others of its sort. [14] Further, the juxtaposed phonemes should be meaning-bearers as they are pronounced simultaneously as a collection. [15] Similarly, both in syntactic and semantic terms, the sentence is not possible without the words as the constituents thereof. The *Padavādins* also endorse that when deconstructing a sentence, its meaning becomes damaged if we remove a certain constituent-meaning because the constituents have their own meanings. The role played by the subordinate clauses (*avāntaravākya/ vakyāntara/ bhedavākya*) of the complex sentences has been another strong point in favour of the logicity of the *Padavāda*. [16] For example, in the sentence 'Devadatta, do you know that we live in Kashmir?' [17] the words in the subordinate clause are as vital as the rest of the expression because without the former the expression may lead to ambiguity and uncertainty. [18] The constructability argument thus justifies the capability of the words as the irreplaceable building blocks of the language.

Another critique of the *Vākyavāda* is that if the indivisibility of our comprehension is established on the ground that the semantic move (*kriyā*) [19] expressed by a linguistic expression remains undivided and unitary, the fact that the words have meanings of their own does not oppose the thesis. It is because different attributives such as adjectives can comfortably be employed in a *vākya* without impairing the meaning of the main action therein. 'White' or 'he-goat' in the example 'he should kill a white he-goat' are in fact replaceable with another with no harm to the grammatical subject's action of 'killing (someone else)'. The Vedic authority, which should be referred to when deciphering uncertain sentential meanings, is also not affected by one's doing so. [20] In the original context where this expression is found, another substitute, say a 'sheep', may well be suitable as long as it is white in the absence of a 'he-goat' and also a he-goat of different colour in the absence of a white one. [21] Clear enough, the *Padavādins'* attempt to defend their position fails here too because the semantic move is neither limited to the highly contextualized situations like this nor the only factor which powers the indivisibility thesis.

Bhartṛhari discusses extensively the Mīmāṃsakas' views on the rules advocated by the Sanskrit mainstream grammarians.^[22] Among them, the discussion upon the 'prasajya pratiṣedha' (propositional negation) and the 'paryudāsa pratiṣedha' (term negation)^[23] is remarkably important for that line of argument can be raised to question the logicity of defining the Brahman via negation. Briefly put, it is argued how it would be possible to negate an expression either completely or partially by employing the negational particle '-na-' and the negational suffixes 'a-' and 'an-' in Sanskrit if the words of that expression do not have their own meanings. Moreover, the Mīmāṃsakas place emphasis on the view that a word may have its primary (*mukhya*) and secondary (*gauṇa*) meanings which cannot be distinguished as such if the word is void of its individual meaning. ^[24] Their example is that the aphorisms in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* should be read for their primary meaning whereas literal expressions in use such as 'siṃho mānavakaḥ' (man is a lion) should be read for its secondary meaning. I will return later to the discussion on the dichotomy of the primary-secondary meaning of the word.

2. Bhartṛhari's Response to *Padavādins*

The primacy of the word cannot be held tenable due to a number of reasons. When examined closely, it becomes obvious that the grounding for Bhartṛhari to reject the *Padavāda* is the fact that any linguistic expression needs to convey a complete meaning so as to be utilized for practical communication. The proponents of the *Vākyavāda*, therefore, question why some expressions remain ambiguous to us when the meaning of even one of its constituents is not understood.^[25] Evidently, this inquiry is made so as to attack the *Padavāda* philosophers' argument aforementioned that the isolated ambiguous expressions need to be provided with more words to make them meaningful. Provided the word-meanings are real and capable enough to convey the sentential meaning, in such a case, the rest of the expression irrespective of the unknown unit must convey the complete meaning. The word-meanings are then unreal and meaningless taken out of the semantic whole, the *vākya*.

Another branch of the arguments against the *Padavāda* is that there are no boundaries (*avadhi*) of the words both in practical communication to which Bhartṛhari himself favours and even in prescriptive grammar which especially interests his opponents. Though this line of thought is contextualized within Sanskrit language, it not only disproves the highly regarded dominance of prescriptive grammar in the language but also reasserts the necessity for considering the natural use of the language to be real. Bhartṛhari's stance on this matter is expressed explicitly in the following *kārikā*.^[26]

*rūpanāśe padānāṃ syāt kathaṃ cāvadhikalpanā
agrhitāvadhau śabde kathaṃ cārtho vivicyate*

When the destruction of the word-forms happens, how can there be an idea about the boundaries of the words? When the boundaries of the words are not understood, how is the meaning (of the words) distinguished?

The rules pertaining to *sandhi* or euphonic combinations are strictly followed in the Sanskrit grammar. As we learn, they are not arbitrary because they have carefully been systematized to explicate the natural phonetic

changes in the word forms we utter. In other words, those rules are the only way in the Sanskrit language that could scientifically reason why and how our natural flow of utterance is heard different from the same series of the words pronounced by purposely discriminating one word from another. Bhartṛhari's argument is that by taking the words as the primary units of the language, we are only considering their 'uncombined' and 'discriminated' form exactly like those in a lexicon but not their typical deformed forms in practical communication. 'Dadhyānaya' (bring curd) is an imperative expression where two discriminated linguistic forms (*dadhi* + *ānaya*) are euphonicly fused together. The first unit 'dadhi' (curd) is the pure form of the word but transforms itself into 'dadhy-' in order to get combined with the subsequent word beginning with a vowel. Then it is reasonable that the primitive form (*dadhi*) and the transformed form (*dadhy-*) are different from each other in terms of the phonetic structure. Unless uttered individually as if when reading it in a lexicon, 'dadhi' thus never appears in its pure form when followed by another word beginning with a vowel. Another aspect of the misleading nature of the Sanskrit euphonic combination is that the words in their pure form which are juxtaposed with such others may convey one meaning whereas, having combined, they may convey another totally different from the former. For instance, 'śvā itaḥ dhāvati' where the former two words are in their uncombined pure forms means 'the dog runs from here' but in 'śvetaḥ dhāvati' where the first two words are euphonicly combined as in the natural articulation, the meaning is that 'the white (one) runs'. [27] When it comes to the language in general, though not supported by any sort of established rules in grammar, it is manifest that our relaxed pronunciation causes slurs. Consider for example how the following slurs in English originally taken to be composed of a few words are pronounced as indivisible phrases; lemme (let-me), whadja (what-did-you), wheredja (where-did-you), wussat (what-is-that). In some languages where supra-segmental sounds are common, this type of phraseologies may be more difficult to be sorted out in such a way that their constituents become discriminated.

All the examples above support the thesis that most of the words employed in actual language usage do not keep their pure forms but undergo phonetic changes in different proportions. This view of Bhartṛhari particularly rejects the ontic significance or the eternality (*nityatā*) of the words and casts insightful light on how semantically influential that inconstancy could be. Moreover, by underlining the necessity of grammatical analysis for reasoning why and how words become subject to phonic changes in communication, those promoting the *Padavāda* have to acknowledge incontrovertibly that the words cannot retain their pure forms in reality. What is impermanent is unreal and untrue in the Bhartṛhari's system of thought as already mentioned and the impermanent word thus fails to act as the 'primary' unit in the language.

How does Bhartṛhari then explain the phonic changes that occur within the *vākya* and defend the semantic lucidity in contrast to the distortion of the word and the word-meaning immediately discussed? As already shown, the differentiation of the linguistic form (*śabda*) is desirable to grammarians but when the *vākya* is taken to be the semantic whole, the euphonic combinations or, broadly put, the phonic changes of its alleged constituents do not obstruct the sentential meaning. Even if the phonic changes, by means of sequence, make the linguistic units of the sentence appear to be different in form, the meaning of the sentence does not give rise to ambiguity because the aggregate of sounds (*śruti*) remains unchanged. [28] Phonemes are capable enough to transform themselves in order to adapt other phonic environments as illustrated in our example above; 'dadhi'

becomes 'dadhy-'. Therefore, as also in another classic example 'ardharcaḥ' (ardha + rcaḥ) which means 'half of the hymn', the naturally fused form does not fail to convey its meaning within the sentence it is employed. As regards 'śvetaḥ' given above, the linguistic form becomes the signifier of both meanings (ubhayārthapratyāyaka), i.e. 'the dog from here' and 'the white one'. In other words, śvetaḥ is taken to have a single form (ekarūpatā) in phonetic terms but two forms in semantic terms.^[29] Significant is then not the structure/ form (rūpa) of the linguistic units but the idea understood from them as a whole. This stance of the Vākyavādins does not, however, contradict the view above that the words do not have fixed boundaries because, according to the indivisibility thesis, the linguistic completeness or deficiency of a certain expression never matters as long as that expression is semantically saturated.

It is worth considering briefly the theory of common applicability (tantranyāya) at this point to strengthen the aforementioned view of Bhartṛhari. He makes use of the term 'tantra' in several places in the VP^[30] when discussing how the phonetically differentiated words could bear a single and semantically unitary form. Accordingly, to the Mīmāṃsakas, tantra is the extension of one particular practice or theory to many other applications.^[31] It differs from the other modes of applying mantras and ritualistic practices in Vedic rituals such as ūha, pratidhi, bādha and prasaṅga because of its special function.^[32] In the light of Puṅyarāja's usage of the term where tantra is employed along with other words denoting instrumentality such as samāśraya,^[33] dharma^[34] and upāya^[35] it seems to me that tantra more accurately translates as 'common applicability'. While commenting on the term with its singular instrumental case ending, Puṅyarāja interprets 'tantrēṇa' as synonymous to 'sādhāraṇyena'^[36] (owing to a generality) and Bhartṛhari as 'sāmānādhikaraṇyena' (owing to having agreement among the inflected forms of the words) though only in one place.^[37] In the example 'śvetaḥ' discussed above, that linguistic form does not differ in terms of its phonetic structure but possesses two types of power to convey both meanings, i.e. (a) the power to convey the property of whiteness (śuklajātīya-pratyāyana-śakti) and (b) the power to convey the property of dogness (prāṇivīṣeṣa-pratyāyana-śakti). Accordingly, the duality of the meaning is made possible through the common applicability of the linguistic form and, though probably unintended by the speaker as such, either or both meanings can be understood by the listener.^[38] The propriety of either meaning is decided by the sentence grasped as a semantic whole.^[39] Our understanding of audible sounds (dhvani/ nāda) as phonically single, though in reality it could be categorized into different notes of the scale, is also an example^[40] for the fact that any note can be applied commonly as a type of sound. All in all, the theory of common applicability has been of considerable significance in postulating the indivisibility thesis since it bridges the semantic variations and the changes of the words in euphonic combinations.

3. Arguments Countered

In the Vākyakāṇḍa, the second book of the Vākyapadīya, Bhartṛhari discards a set of assorted arguments advanced against the primacy of the sentence and the sentential meaning.^[41] Prominent among them is the rejection of the sentential meaning claimed to be a semantic whole necessarily constructed by constituents. Accordingly, the position of the opponents of the Akhaṇḍapakṣavāda is that the words could bear meanings of their own and thus build up the larger body of meaning, i.e. the sentential meaning. The Padavādins' views that

are twelve in number are as follows.^[42] Bhartṛhari's counterarguments are presented here against each claim by the opponents.

a. Each word is marked by 'what is to be signified by it'.^[43]

It is maintained by the upholders of the *Padavāda* that the words can be introduced as those having the quality of the 'to-be-signified' (*pratyaḥlakṣaṇa*) on the ground that that quality is not the content of the eternal linguistic form (*Śabda*) but is produced with our effort. The words are made capable enough to signify both (a) the physical objects such as 'cow' or 'pot' that have a distinguishable shape grasped by perception (*darśana*), practice (*abhyāsa*) and usage (*prayoga*) and (b) the abstract concepts such as 'heaven' or 'god' to which a particular shape cannot be assigned. They can thus be subdivided into two categories; '*ākāraprathana*' (expressive of forms) and '*nākāraprathana*' (expressive of non-forms) respectively. The words signifying a particular form can do as such just because we intentionally assign the words to that particular form and thereby grasp it (*ākāraparigraha*). It is we who enable a particular form, by means of continuous practice, to have what is assigned to it by a word. As long as we employ a particular linguistic form to mean 'something', that very linguistic form will be capable enough to refer to that 'something' itself.

b. Words reveal the all-embracing meaning of what they stand for.

The argument is that the word reveals the generic property, as well as the distinctive features (*bheda*) of its referent and all those semantic properties, should be treated as the word meaning. Nevertheless, Bhartṛhari objects to this position by stating that such distinctive features subsequent to the generic property are brought to notice only by usage (*prayoga*).^[44] The individual words do not reveal the so-called distinct features when they evoke the generic properties of their referents but only the generic properties per se. They are not thus capable of providing the complete meaning of what they stand for.^[45] The language users understand the referents they wish to by intentionally assigning the words to them (*vastumātraniveśitatvāt*). For example, the word 'pot' is capable enough to reveal the generic 'potness' only but not anything more about it.^[46] Further, an imperative like 'honour (the gods)' (*yajeta*) could only denote its unavoidable element (*nāntarīyakī*) which is the semantic move (*kriyā*) of the expression, 'honouring (the gods)' itself.^[47] It is consequently valid that the complete meaning of a linguistic expression could be its idiosyncratic usage also expanded by its distinct features.^[48]

c. Words signify the meaning which is stable in terms of usage and means of action.

In a meaningful word, the usage of a word and its means to make a semantic move in the listener's mind are stable. This is presumably a counterargument by the proponents of the *Padavāda* to Bhartṛhari's response immediately considered. As they hold, the view that the word signifies only the unavoidable property of the referent but we comprehend some more is not tenable. For example, it cannot be defended that one who hears the word 'cow' that reveals only its generic property 'cowness' should also continue working on it to understand its distinctive features, i.e., those not revealed by the very linguistic unit. Therefore, it is possible that every sort of meaning is expressed by the word. The words obtain the capacity of embracing all facets of its meaning

through 'the dominance/ prominence of the (contextually appropriate?) properties of the referent (*guṇapradhānabhāva*)'.^[49] In some circumstances, the generic property of the referent will be more prominently appropriated while in some other its distinctive features.

d. Word-meaning is a collection that admits no alternatives or combinations.^[50]

The word meaning is a collection of multiple forms (*ākārasamudāya*) of a referent but not an alternative for another referent or a combination of several referents. This position also maintains a counterargument against Bhartṛhari's saying that the word-meaning can, through practice, be made to denote its '*bheda*' or distinct features in addition to its generic unavoidable property. As the *Padavādins* raise their objections, the word-meaning which by itself (i.e. without our attributing anything external to it) includes all the generic and distinctive forms of the referent is then a collection of forms. But unlike Bhartṛhari's view, a single word-meaning (a) is a non-alternative (*avikalpa*) for another referent and (b) is not a combination of any alternative referents (*asamuccaya*). If the former view is taken to be tenable, the word, i.e. the linguistic form in question should be an alternative word (*vacanavikapla*) and if it is the latter, a plural (*bahuvacana*). For example, the word 'pot' can signify all the generic and specific forms of the referent 'pot' but by itself reveals neither another alternative meaning nor a combination of such meanings ascribed to it by the language users. The *Padavādins* thus postulate that the word-meaning which is devoid of alternatives and the combination of many such others reveals itself as it is.^[51]

e. Word-meaning cannot exist without being related to its signifier, the word.^[52]

The *Padavāda* philosophers decline to accept that the word-meaning could be derived only after the sentential meaning is grasped as the *Vākyavādins* hold. They explain their tenet as follows. The linguistic units such as 'pot' express their relation with the referents, i.e. 'pot-ness' etc. Without being related as said, it is not possible for that relationship to exist and consequently, it will be 'not true'.^[53] In other words, the word-meaning remains true only when the word can establish a relation between itself and its referent. The words are capable of being semantically independent because it is not the sentence that provides meanings for the words.

f. Word-meaning is the relation between the word and something extant which is conditioned by something nonextant.^[54]

Puṇyārāja does not provide any informative account of this view except that the word-meaning is 'marked by the nonextant conditions' (*astyopādhivicitrita*) though it may signify an extant referent. ^[55] However, Śāntarakṣita enumerates this view more clearly in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* and casts enough light on the matter in question. ^[56] According to him, the word-meaning is the real referent with its unreal adjuncts (*upādhi*) or ephemeral forms. Gold is the real object, for instance, though it may appear in its numerous unreal forms such as ornaments, coins etc.^[57] Therefore, the word-meaning is viewed as the generic form of the referent plus its particular forms.

Evident from the *kārikā* is that Bhartṛhari also agrees, at least into some extent, with this position. Whether a word expresses the generic property of its referent or the particular properties thereof was a puzzling issue even before Bhartṛhari as obvious from the views of Vājapyāyana and Vyāḍi. As also confirmed by Puṇyārāja, it is the standpoint of Bhartṛhari that the generic property of the referent which is devoid of variations is the ‘essential meaning’ of a linguistic form. [58] The referent ‘cow’ can be denoted by the word ‘cow’ as long as its generic property, viz. ‘cow-ness’ is present in that referent even if the variable data such as its colour and size are missing. [59] Do the linguistic units that describe the variable particulars of a referent then remain subordinate? For example, are the attributives such as big (*sthūla*), short (*hrasva*), variegated (*karbura*), brindled (*śabala*) etc. which may describe a cow meaningless? It is not so. Since a linguistic unit reveals the generic property of a referent at a certain occasion and its distinctive properties at another, the causal agent or the cause of application (*pravṛttinimitta*) of that linguistic unit itself is its meaning. [60] Therefore, the generic property, cowness, is the ‘reason’ of our applying the word ‘cow’ to the referent with a dewlap, an udder etc. and it is the meaning of that linguistic unit. Bhartṛhari’s analogy here is ‘water’ of which the universal nature or the generic ‘water-ness’ (or say, the combination of hydrogen and oxygen in the proportion of H₂O as chemistry teaches us) remains unchanged even if it can be seen in different forms and statuses, i.e. ice, snow and steam. [61] In total, the linguistic form (*śabda*) denotes the generic property of referents which is ‘not modified by particulars (*aparāmr̥ṣṭaviśeṣa*)’ because such particulars are avoidable or not inherent (*antarīyaka*). [62]

g. Word and word-meaning are identical

The identity of the word with its signified is also a considerably significant view held by the upholders of the *Padavāda*. Hence, the word and the word-meaning are two sides of the same coin. While the word-meaning becomes more prominent in practical communication, both the word and the word-meaning are equally important in grammar and either may be selected at the speaker’s discretion. [63] The way of identifying the word with its meaning is superimposition (*adhyāsa*). [64] The word as a linguistic unit is superimposed upon an object as ‘that is this’ (*saḥ + ayaṃ*), i.e. the superimposition occurs in the form that ‘the word is its meaning itself’. [65] Consequently, even if the word and the word-meaning are identical, only the word-meaning is prioritized in the practical use of the language. [66] Upon observing a quadruped animal with a dewlap, horns, an udder etc, we superimpose the word ‘cow’ upon it and understand that object as such. But in the language analysis, viz. grammar, both aspects of this superimposition are available and the language user, depending upon what he desires to deal with, may consider either of them. [67]

h. Word-meaning has no individual capacity but is not subservient to the word.

The meaning of the word is void of any power of its own but ‘not subservient to the word’ (*śabdādāhīnā*) whereby it is expressed and understood. [68]

i. Word-meaning has all the capacity to be independent.

This view is the opposite of the eighth. Having all capabilities of its own, the word-meaning is revealed in the form of verbal action (*kriyasādhyarūpa*) in some cases and in the established form (*siddharūpa*) in others.^[69]

In the light of the Sanskrit grammar, this position of the *Padavādins* could be deciphered with more clarity. An action-denoting verb may be either (a) ‘a verb which retains its sense of the action either continuous or in the process of being accomplished’ (*sādhya*) or (b) ‘a verb which has lost its sense of the action and has thus become a noun’ (*siddha*). Therefore, these two terms denote *kriyā* (action inclusive of the state of condition) and *kāraka* (participant in or deliverer of the action) respectively. Accordingly, the meaning of the word may, in some circumstances, (a) be stable, non-sequential and thus established (*siddha*) and in other circumstances, (b) be marked by sequence and motion. Moreover, *siddha* and *sādhya* verbs can respectively be read as those of the ‘past’ and ‘future’ tenses.^[70] In summary, the *Padavāda* favours that the word-meaning could be of all forms of action.

j. Word-meaning is the content of the idea caused by an external object

Our intellect grasps the word-meaning as an idea triggered by an external object. Such an object is understood as ‘this-is-an-external-object’ even if it not external. The reason for this is an illusion (*bhrama*).^[71] The verbs that express an action, for example, cannot do as such if the form of the idea in our mind does not encroach upon the external objects referred to by them. The idea ‘Bring the cow’ will remain not denoted by the proper linguistic forms unless it gets connected to the external referents.

k. Word-meaning may remain either related to the manifested memory or in the form of awareness unrelated to any.^[72]

Obviously, this position also evokes the opinion discussed in the first view that the word-meaning represents both types of referents with or without distinguishable forms. The word-meanings that represent the referents with forms (*ākāra*) are related to our memory as they could call forth our previous apprehension of the objects.^[73] Nevertheless, those that refer to the referents without forms (*nirākāra*) are nothing more than our awareness of them. The word ‘cow’ should evoke if we have already grasped that object through our perception, practice and usage, our memory of the animal known as such while the words like ‘heaven’ or ‘hell’ will convey only an awareness without any memory related to them.

l. Word-meaning conveyed by a single linguistic unit can be manifold due to a number of reasons.^[74]

Among all the views to strengthen the primacy of the word and the word-meaning, this view is the most compromising with the dominance of the practical usage of the language over the meanings of our linguistic expressions. Similarly, this is what Bhartṛhari not only leaves as plausible but also supports in line with his indivisible thesis and favour to philosophical perspectivism. According to that view, the meaning of a linguistic

unit is not an irreplaceably established entity but one which becomes subject to change considerably and thus undergoes manifoldness. In order to clarify this, Bhartṛhari gives the analogy of an impaired eye that grasps a single object as if manifold.

A linguistic form uttered by the speaker may be understood by numerous, different listeners in divergent ways. [75] Puṇyārāja juxtaposes here, for an example, the views maintained by different schools of philosophy on ‘arthapratipatti’ (understanding the meaning). [76] Some such as the Jainas and the Buddhists consider the meaning to be a collection of atomic constituents (*paramāṇusamuccaya*) while some others like the Sāṅkhyas a compilation of aptitudes (*guṇasamāhāra*). The same listener may comprehend the same linguistic unit differently in line with the changes in spatiotemporal contexts it is uttered in and his own acquaintance with the disciplines related to the referent in question. [77] Since the meaning in the language thus remains inconstant (*anavastitha*), faulty (*sāparādha*) and encounters a number of obstacles against its natural manifestation (*bahucchala*), we could grasp it but fail to understand the Real nature of the language.[78] For communication, this manifoldness and inconstancy of the language should exist. As a result, even the advanced-minded that could see the unitary face of the language have to descend to this unreal stratum for communication purposes and in that aspect, they become similar to general humans.[79]

Conclusion

How can it be justified that we the ordinary humans do not see the Real and true face of the language despite our recurrent language use? Bhartṛhari responds to this query as follows. Our perception of objects with the help of the organs of sense does not tell us the Real nature of the language as in the case that the firmament seems to be flat or ablaze but it is not so in reality. [80] In order to understand that illusory nature of objects, perception alone is not sufficient but reasoning (*yukti*) may help. Nevertheless, even reasoning might not explain everything when it comes to speaking about the objects we perceive. Then, for communication, a wise person should not seek anything else but the practical usage of the language per se[81] however ‘imperfect and misleading’ it may appear to be on the path toward the liberation. [82]

Conscientious scrutiny of the *Vākyakāṇḍa* reveals that all the twelve views discussed thus far have been taken into consideration in different ways both in forming and sharpening the indivisibility thesis. Bhartṛhari may have carefully selected them to represent the diverse mass of the arguments on the meaning of a linguistic expression up to his time. The last view, in particular, paves the way to fortifying Bhartṛhari’s tenet that the Reality which is single is understood as if divided and multifaceted by us who have not improved the mind to enjoy the eternal beatific trance, the *Śabdabrahma*. It has been Bhartṛhari’s stance that, as Puṇyārāja metaphorically states with a Sanskrit proverbial phrase ‘*na piṣṭapeṣaṇamācaraṇīyam*’ (no need of grinding the ground), to adhere to useless efforts such as dry reasoning with the usage of painstakingly carved out grammar rules is not required because the conventional practice of the language is what could show us the path to the unified Reality. [83]

References

- 1 . Coward, H. G. and Raja, K. K. (eds.). Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies, Vol. V: *The philosophy of the grammarians*. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1990: 22; Houben, J. E. M. *The Sambandha-samuddeśa (chapter on relation) and Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language*. Gonda Indological Series, 2. Groningen, Egbert Forste, 1995: 3-10; Iyer, K. A. S. *Bhartṛhari: A study of Vākyapadīya in the light of ancient commentaries*. Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series, 68. Pune, Deccan College Postgraduate Research Institute, 1969: 3; Śāstrī, G. B. *The philosophy of word and meaning: Some Indian approaches with special reference to the philosophy of Bhartṛhari*. Calcutta, Calcutta Sanskrit College, 1959: 56.
- 2 . For Bhartṛhari's respect to the tradition, see: VP. 2.485 - 487.
- 3 . Houben, J. E. M. "Who are Bhartṛhari's *padadarśins*? On the development of Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language". (eds. S. Bhate; J. Bronkhorst) *Bhartṛhari, Philosopher and Grammarian: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari* (University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992). Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1994: 155; '[K]ārikā 2. 57 is the only place in the VP where these two groups are explicitly juxtaposed.'
- 4 . VP. 2.57.
- 5 . Here, the literal translation of '-*pūrvaka*' is 'preceded by'. In the light of the context, I prefer to read it in the sense 'in reality' as the natural, real state of the language is taken to be 'prior' to our analysis which is then an intentional activity 'secondary' or 'subsequent' thereto.
- 6 . VP. 2.58 - 59, Cf. RP (*Rkprātisākhya*). 2.1; N. 1.17.
The Vedic reading of this phrase which takes '*padaprakṛti*' as a *Bahuvrīhi* (exocentric) compound is that the *Samhitās* or the Vedas have the '*pada*' texts as their source whereas Durga who considers the phrase as a *Tatpuruṣa* (determinative) compound reads it as '*padānām prakṛtiḥ*' (source of the words). If the latter reading is the accurate one, the Vedas can then be considered to be the source of *padapāthas* as well because the Pada texts are a product of analysis which is possible only if the aggregation (*saṃhitā*) is already present. Obviously, Bhartṛhari prefers to be clinging to the latter reading but also hints that the former view is also possible (since in analysis are seen the words in a sentence). Cf. VP. 2. 58 *padānām saṃhitā yoniḥ saṃhitā vā padāśrayā*
For details: Cf. Cardona, G. "Studies in Indian Grammarians, I; The method of description reflected in the *Śivasūtras*". *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Vol. 59, No. 1. 1969: 33. fn. 82.*
- 7 . VPpr. (*Vākyapadīya: Puṇyārāja's Commentary, Tīkā*) 2.57 *atha yadi naivaṃ sthitiḥ, tatkatham 'padaprakṛtiḥ saṃhitā' iti prātisākhyaṃ | atra hi padāni prakṛtiḥ yasyāḥ saṃhitāyāḥ ityartho vyākhyāyate | padānāncāsatyatvāt tatkāraṇikā saṃhitāpyuktā syādityālocya.*
- 8 . VP. 2.60.
- 9 . VP. 2.40 *vākyārthasya tadaiko'pi varṇah pratyāyakaḥ kvacit.*
- 10 . Cf. VP. 2.68 *viśeṣā na hi sarveṣāṃ satām śabdo'bhidhāyakaḥ.*
- 11 . VPpr. 2.72 *asti ca tadarthe kasyacit sandeha iti pṛthagevārthavanti padāni vijñātāni vākyamityeva vaktum yuktamiti.*
- 12 . For more examples such as '*vanāt pika ānīyatām*' (bring a cuckoo from the forest) and '*śvetam chāgamālabheta*' [(he) should sacrificially kill a white he-goat], Cf. VP. 2.72 - 74. The meaning would remain uncertain if the listener is not familiar with what is referred to by *pika* in the former and ignores the specification added by the adjective in the latter.
- 13 . VP. 2.61.
- 14 . Cf. VPpr. 2.62 *kenacit sajātiyeṇa vilakṣaṇena vā saṃsṛṣṭam sad gṛhyate.*
- 15 . VPpr. 2.63 *sānnidhyāt sahoccāraṇāt.*
- 16 . VP. 2.76, Cf. VP. 2.325 *sāpekṣā ye tu vākyārthāḥ padārthaireva te samāḥ.*
- 17 . VPpr. 2.77 *abhijānāsi devadatta kasmīreṣu vasyāmaḥ.*
- 18 . Bhartṛhari's view on the subordinate clauses is the direct opposite of the *Padavādins*'. Just like its constituent words, a subordinate clause desires the meaning of the complex sentence to express its own meanings. Put differently, the understanding of the complete complex sentence is compulsory for understanding the subordinate clause for the former is the source of the latter. Obviously, the former prevails all over the latter and also remains indifferent from the latter. Cf. VP. 2.456.
- 19 . By *kriyā* is certainly meant the 'semantic move' conveyed by the predicate in a linguistic expression. As long as the *kriyā* remains unchanged, the meaning of the complete expression may not be subject to a drastic change in the mind of the listener. Consider the relative constancy of the action of 'sitting (on something)' in the expression 'the cat sits on the mat' where the noun and adverbial phrase can easily be modified without any harm to the semantic move. Thus, semantic move

- may well be the transition of our cognition from one layer of understanding to another upon grasping a change in the linguistic form uttered. Honda, Y. "Bhartṛhari's definition of *kriyā*". (eds. S. Bhate & J. Bronkhorst) *Bhartṛhari, Philosopher and Grammarian: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari* (University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992). Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass. 1994: 141 - 154; Cf. Sarkar, S. *Logic, probability, and epistemology: the power of semantics*. Science and Philosophy in the Twentieth Century Series, vol. 3. New York, Garland Pub. Co., 1996: xv; Grillo, E. *Power without domination: dialogism and the empowering property of communication*. Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society, and Culture Series, vol. 12. Amsterdam; Philadelphia, John Benjamins Pub. Co. 2005: 13; Taguchi, N. *Pragmatic competence*. Mouton Series in Pragmatics, 5. Berlin; New York, Mouton de Gruyter. 2009: 87.
- 20 . Cf. VP. 2.74 – 75.
- 21 . VP. 2.73; Cf. VPpr. on the same *kārikā*. *śvetābhāve'nyaguṇasya chāgasyālabhanamanuṣṭhīyate | chāgābhāve ca śvetaguṇayuktasya meṣasyālabhanamiti pratidhisamāśrayeṇa na śrutibādhaḥ*.
- 22 . VP. 2.77 - 83. Since Bhartṛhari's *Vṛtti* on these *kārikās* is missing, we have to resort to Puṅyarāja's commentary only.
- 23 . Matilal B.K. and Tiwari, H. *Logical and ethical issues: an essay on Indian philosophy of religion*. Chronicle Classics Series. New Delhi, Chronicle Books; Bangalore, Distributed by Orient Longman, 2004: 128 - 130; Wood, T. E. *Nāgārjunian disputations: A philosophical journey through an Indian looking-glass*. Society for Asian and Comparative philosophy Series, No. 11. Honolulu, HI, University of Hawaii Press. 1994: 60 – 62.
- 24 . VPpr. 2.74 – 77.
- 25 . VPpr. 2.92 *eka padārthasandehe sakalamevāvijñātaṃ vākyamityucyate*.
- 26 . VP. 2.95.
- 27 . Cf. VP. 2.468; another classic example is '*alambusānāṃ yātā*' which may mean either 'he has gone to the *Alambusā* country' (*alambusānāṃ-yātā*) or 'this one which has attained the colour of straw is now fit' (*alaṃ-busānāṃ-yātā*). This is to illustrate how arbitrarily the sounds in the practical language use may alter the meaning. Also Cf. Dāsgupta, S. N. & Bhattacharya, S. (eds.) *Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali*. New Delhi, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1991: 63; Śāstrī, S. B. (tr.). *Āgasamuccaya alias Vākyapadiya, Brahmakāṇḍa of Bhartṛhari*. Leipzig, Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig, 1957: 69.
- 28 . VP. 2.103.
- 29 . VPpr. 2.96 - 97, 111.
- 30 . VP. 2.108 - 111, 374, 379, 469, 470, 473, 475 etc.
- 31 . Chari, V. K. Sanskrit criticism. Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1990: 163.
- 32 . The upholders of the *Padavāda* take these technical operations to be meaningful and thereby argue in favour of the semantic independence of the word. Cf. Tilak, S. *Understanding Karma: in light of Paul Ricoeur's philosophical anthropology & hermeneutics*. Nagpur, International Centre for Cultural Studies. 2006: 65; Śāstrī, G. B. *A study in the dialectics of Sphoṭa*. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1980: 20
- 33 . VPpr. 2.470.
- 34 . VP. 2.473.
- 35 . VP. 2.475.
- 36 . VPpr. 2.374, 379; Cf. VP. 2.394, 395.
- 37 . VPbh. (*Vākyapadiya*: Bhartṛhari's own Commentary, *Vṛtti*) 2.379.
- 38 . VPpr. and VPbh. 2.471. The function of the theory of common applicability is illustrated with the analogy of 'fire' that emits both heat and light out of which we select what we desire to suit our needs. We may not desire both simultaneously but are incapable of stopping the both being produced. Cf. VP. 2. 473-475 for examples from Sanskrit grammar rules.
- 39 Coward (1990: 142) translates '*tantranyāya*' as the 'theory of extended meaning' which leaves some ambiguity since it does not say anything about the function of the theory.
- 40 . VP. 2. 111.
- 41 . The authority of the arguments is given neither in the *kārikās* nor in the commentaries thereon but they are assumed to have been strong enough to be judged against Bhartṛhari's tenet at least during his time. Cf. Kamalaśīla's interpretation of some verses in the *Vākyakāṇḍa* of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadiya*. (eds. S. Bhate and J. Bronkhorst) *Bhartṛhari, Philosopher and Grammarian: proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari* (University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992). Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1994: 136.

42 . VP. 2.119 – 134.

43 . VP. 2.119, 120.

44 . This view is very supportive of Bhartṛhari's tenet that the meaning of a linguistic expression cannot be traced without taking into account how it is actually used in communication.

45 . VPpr. 2.122 *na hi sakalaviśeṣasahitamārthaṃ śabdaḥ pratyāyitumalamiti.*

46 . VPpr. 2.122 *ghaṭādīnāṃ prasiddhānāmākārān vācakaḥ śabdo ghaṭādir na pratyāyayati pṛthubudhnodarākāraniveśitatvāt.*

What is emphatic in this view is that the 'complete' meaning of a word may vary drastically from one to another, from one speech community to another or even from one occasion to another. Usage is the most decisive factor in meaning, as Bhartṛhari maintains in his philosophy.

47 . VP. 2.123.

48 . VP. 2.124 *prayogastvanuniṣpādinī śabdārtha iti gamyate.*

49 . VPpr. 2.125; '*Guṇapradhānabhāva*' is a concept nourished by both grammarians and semanticists including literary critics. For instance, Sanskrit semanticists consider that, in an expression like '*putreṇa saha āgataḥ pitā*', (Along with the son came the father), the word in the subject position (*pitā*) is construed as having more influence on the activity of 'coming' while the word in instrumental case (*putreṇa*) is subordinate to the doer's action. The priority in terms of the influence upon the semantic move in the expression is given to the action of the 'father' here over that of the 'son'. Cf. SK (*Siddhāntakaumudī*). 2.3.19 *sahārthena yukte apradhāne tṛtīyasyāt* on P. (Pāṇinīya Aṣṭādhyāyī) 2. 3. 19 *sahayukte apradhāne*. I assume that Bhartṛhari exerts *guṇapradhānabhāva* in a sense at least very close to that advocated by the above mentioned groups.

50 . VP. 2.126.

51 . VPpr. 2.126 *avidyamānau vikalpasamuccayau yasyāsau tathābhūtastasmāt pratīyata iti sambhāvayate.*

52 . VP. 2.126.

53 . As mentioned above, being true is 'never to cease to exist' in Bhartṛhari's system of philosophy.

54 . Cf. Coward 1990: 142 and Hattori 1994: 136. As Kamalaśīla reads it, this view translates as 'the real with unreal adjuncts is the cause of the application of a word'.

55 . VPpr. 2.127.

56 . TatS (*Tattvasaṅgraha*). 889 - 890. Cf. Jha, G. (ed.). *The Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita: with the commentary of Kamalaśīla*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series by Oriental Institute, Vadodara. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1937: 481.

57 . Cf. VP. 3. 2.2 - 4; The permanent nature of a substance is ascertained through its ephemeral forms.

58 . VPpr. 2.153 *śabdasyādṛṣṭavyabhicāraṃ sāmānyamevārthaḥ.*

59 . Cf. VPpr. 2.154 *ākārayo vyabhicāratvāt śabdavācyā na bhavanti.*

60 . VPpr. 2.155 *yaddhi prayojakaṃ śabdasya tadeva tasya vācyam, anyannāntarīyakam.*

Cf. Iyer (1969: 316) translates prayojaka as the 'prompter'. See: Scharf, P. M. (1996). "The denotation of generic terms in ancient Indian philosophy: Grammar, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā". *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, New Series, Vol. 86, No. 3, 1996: 22 for his translation of it as 'the semantic condition for (the word's) usage'.

Patañjali divides the nouns into three categories; the linguistic units that express (a) *jātiśabda* (generic properties), (b) *guṇaśabda* (quality properties), (c) *kriyāśabda* (action properties). But he rejects *yadr̥cchāśabda* (those arbitrarily expressing the properties of a referent, viz. proper names) on the ground that they do not have any cause of application on the part of the referent. MBh (*Mahābhāṣya*) on *Śivasūtra* 2; *catuṣṭayī śabdānāṃ pravṛttiḥ : jātiśabdāḥ guṇaśabdāḥ kriyāśabdāḥ yadr̥cchāśabdāḥ caturthāḥ.*

61 . VP. and VPpr. 2.156.

62 . VPpr. 2.156.

63 . VP. 2.127, 130.

64 . *Adhyāsarūpa* is what Puṇyārāja provides when glossing '*abhijalpatva*' in the original *kārikā*. For the disputation why '*abhijalpatva*' was preferred to '*adhyāropa*' though they are synonymous, see: Houben 1995: 159; Pind, O. H. "Did Dinnāga and Mallavādin know the old Vākyapadīyavṛtti attributed to Bhartṛhari?" *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 3, 2003: 263.

Jha (1937: 482) explains *abhijalpatva* in TatS. 890 as 'coalescence'.

65 VP. 2.128.

- 66 . VPpr. 1.128 *adhyāśavaśācchabdārthayorekātmatve'pyarthāṃśasyeva prādhānyamupayogavaśāt*. Note that the proponents of the *Padavāda* agree with the fact that the words signify the objects whose forms can be traced with perception, exercise and use as discussed in the first view here.
- 67 . VP. 2.130 *śāstre tūbhayarūpatvaṃ pravibhaktvaṃ vivakṣayā*.
- 68 . VPpr. 2.131.
- 69 . VPpr. 2.131 *śaktyarthaḥ kadācit kriyasādhyatayābhidhīyate, kadācit siddharūpatayeti niyatā kriyādirūpatā śabdārthatayā pratipādyate*.
- 70 . Cf. Bhattacharya, S. *Word and sentence: two perspectives: Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein*. New Delhi, Sāhitya Akademi, 2002: 61.
- 71 . VPpr. 2.132.
- 72 . VP. 2.133.
- 73 . VPpr. 2.133.
- 74 . VP. 2.134.
- 75 . VP. 2.135. *vaktrānyathaiva prakrānto bhinneṣu pratipattṛṣu*.
- 76 . VPpr. 2.135.
- 77 . VP. 2.136.
- 78 . VP. 2.138.
- 79 . VP. 2.139 and VPpr. on the same *kārikā*; *vyavahāraḥvyāyāṃ vā te'pyadṛṣṭatattvasadṛṣā iti punaravyavasthaiva*.
- 80 . VP. 2.140.
- 81 . VP. 2.142 *vyavahāre samākhyānaṃ tatprājñā na vikalpayet*.
- 82 . According to Bhartṛhari's position, these are in the sense 'obstructing our way to apprehend the ultimate Reality' but not 'making our communication impossible'.
- 83 . VPpr. 2.142.